INTERACTIONS.
In the world of Arts, the artist has a
peculiar possibility: he can create something and assign a sense only when
the work is finished. Jean Arp (1886-1966) said, about his sculptures:
<< everyone of these bodies has a definite meaning, but it's only
when I feel not to change anything more, I decide what all means and I
give it a name >>. Now I'm interested to value some of the implications
and consequences inferable from this sentence (forgetting the possible
provocative content).
First of all it appears clear the operating
possibility to distinctly separate the practical realization (that is the
definition of a personal syntax) from the attribution of sense. Moreover
it's immediate to think at a multiplicity of meanings (all equally permissible),
and therefore to a choice.
With Duchamp's ready-made we face a very
different case. With them Duchamp talked about the non-necessarity of the definition
of a personal language, demonstrating that it was still possible to make
meaningful artworks: the artwork is built on the meaning, which is expressed
through the ability of the artist to invite to reflect. Provocation and
reflection. The reflecting activity becomes inevitable as the only fundamental
element as of art and as life.
In both cases attribution of meaning is postponed.
Such possibility is not present in common language, nor in computer languages.
However in computer languages and in formal systems - and in Arts, too
- it's possible to mantain syntax separate from semantics, and to redefine
semantics without altering the syntax. No man could do the same thing with
his natural language, because (1) we are inclined to confuse nouns with
their meanings, and (2) syntax and semantics of words are in our heads
too much rigidly connected. Consequently there's one strong link between
artistic languages and computer languages.
Now, let's apply to the world of Art a schematization
that has its origin in computer science (N.B.: the reasoning that follows
is only formal).

We suppose to consider the world V
of artist X,
in the sense of private psychological world of an individual (i.e. culture
and knowledge of X,
with its fears, emotions, etc.) as it's seen from the outside, from who
observes, through Language. One can consider V
like Kandinsky "inner world" too. So we make correspond V
to the world M
of machine T,
and an artwork Oi
to a program Pi
written in a high level language A
(provided with portability features). Pi is interpreted by a suitable interpreter
program (or it is compiled).
So the correspondances are:
X ------
T
V ------
M
Oi
------ Pi
In the same way we can
think about an interpreter automaton (human
or not) who analyzes an artwork O1,
explains it in a comprehensible way, and defines a world V1
as output (with V1
subset of V,
if all works well). Analyzing O2,O3,…,On
we'll obtain V2,V3,…,Vn,
and through their union, an approximation of V
: V'=V1UV2
…
UVn.
Formally, supposing to have built V', one can think that whichever entity
(human or automatic) operating on V'
could construct a set of works {O1',O2',…,On'}
in which X
can recognize itself. In this construction it's necessary, for obvious
reasons, to prescind from any technical or manual ability. However, the
artworks built this way are not injured: it's sufficient to remember the
observations of Duchamp.
Now let consider the operating environment
of a computer system; we have an external entity (a programmer) who writes
a program in a language A:
it's up to the interpreter/compiler program to translate the phrases of
the A
language in sentences comprehensible to the machine. Let's look at the
world M
(that is the equivalent of V):
if the observation of V
makes it possible for us to enter in contact with the sweetness, the obsessions,
the culture (etc.) of X,
what could we obtain from the observation of M?
It's not sensible to attribute feelings to a machine: nevertheless, it's
allowable to attribute poetic-artistic meanings to forms with which world
M
appears to us, as usually is done with V.
Why not to think at a "mechanical poetry" while observing a determinate
machine language listing? Why not to attribute an ęsthetic value
to certain 0 - 1 sequences ? And what should we say about their precision,
their density of sense? It's a matter of peculiarities of the machine (the
individual, in this case): good expressions of its own machine-being. Moreover,
in both cases (i.e. man or machine as individual), changing of interpretation
(or computer, by analogy), starting from the same work (or program) Oi
one arrives to a different world W
in place of V
(or N
in place of M,
considering the machine-individual). That is the expression of the multiplicity
of meanings that become available with an Arp-like method of work, for
example. More precisely, in this case such multiplicity is a consequence
of the clean separation between syntax and semantics and of the possibility
to redefine the semantic ties of symbols. Consequently, there're new interactions
between symbols, meanings, operating methods. We are towards an abundance
of sense possibility, but confusion is not a necessary result. In fact,
the multiplicity of interpretative paths can constitute a higher artistic
value, as it happens e.g. in P.Greenaway, where it assumes the form of
a refined intellectual game.
The previously suggested parallel finds an
authoritative philosophical support in Charles Morris' work, useful as
epistemological foundation of programming languages theory too. Morris
places semiotics as basis for the study not only of language but also of
all human behaviors, Art included, of course. Its theory of semiosis, divided
in syntax, semantics and pragmatics, is applicable also to the computer
science universe in nearly literal sense; in particular all the aspects
of efficiency, flexibility, ease of use of the computer system are subsumed
in Morris' pragmatics. Thus he can be considered a forerunner of the modern
theory of programming languages.
In conclusion, works (of Art) founded on
the phrase of J.Arp exposed in article opening and those of a compiler
can be placed, for many aspects, at the same level. Who ever of the two
gets greater honor from this parallelism? In my opinion J.Arp: infact,
while a machine cannot be interested in anything concerning J.Arp, the
latter instead acquires - by analogy - the rigour that characterizes the
work done by the automaton.